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T O P S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4808

EXDIS

SALT

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SUBJECT: SALT: EXPERTS SESSION NOVEMBER 15

1. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR FARLEY'S PRESENTATION TO NAC AND ENSUING DISCUSSION, GARTHOFF REMAINED FOR EXTENDED SESSION WITH EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS. QUESTIONS CENTERED ON US CONCEPT OF THROW-WEIGHT, AND EQUIVALENT AGGREGATE PLUS ELEMENTS IN AND TACTICS TOWARD REDUCTION IN CURRENT DISPARITY. ROLE OF BOMBERS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ALSO DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH. FINALLY, QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR AND US PLANS FOR DEALING WITH FBS ISSUE ALSO RAISED. END SUMMARY.

2. WILL OT (BELGIUM) ASKED FOR ELABORATION OF FARLEY'S PREVIOUS REFERENCE TO SEA-BASED MIRVS, WHETHER THIS REFERRED TO SURFACE PLATFORMS OR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES AND WHETHER SUCH SYSTEMS WOULD FACILITATE THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM OR SIMPLY TRANSFER IT GEOGRAPHICALLY. GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT SEA-BASED PLATFORMS REFERRED TO LAUNCHERS ON SUBMARINES AND, IF ALLOWED BY A PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT, ALSO TO LAUNCHERS ON SURFACE VESSELS. A VERIFICATION PROBLEM MIGHT ARISE BECAUSE OF RESULTS OF MIRV TESTING IN A SEA-BASED MODE MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AS WELL. SUITABLE CONSTRAINTS MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE US BECAUSE THEY WOULD SERVE TO POSTPONE

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MIRV CAPABILITY FOR THE LARGE SOVIET ICBM'S, E. G. SS-9, WHEREAS OUR MIRVS WERE LARGELY IN POSEIDON. WILLOT FOLLOWED BY ASKING WHETHER US COULD ENVISAGE A SECOND GENERATION MIRV LIMITATION. ALSO, WOULD THERE NOT BE A DIFFICULT VERIFICATION PROBLEM. GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT WE HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND GENERATION MIRV LIMITATION, AND WHILE IT MIGHT BECOME A PRACTICAL ONE AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE WE COULD NOT SEE HOW TO APPLY IT AS THIS TIME. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET TESTED A MIRV. THEY MIGHT DO SO SOON, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THEIRS WILL COMPARE TO OURS, SO THAT WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT MIGHT BECOME FEASIBLE TO IDENTIFY A COMMON MIRV "FIRST GENERATION." THERE WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING WHEN A FIRST GENERATION SYSTEM WOULD BECOME A SECOND GENERATION SYSTEM, AND IN VERIFYING SUCH A DISTINCTION.

3. UK (ROSE) ASKED ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF THROW-WEIGHT AS DEFINED IN THE US LETTER OF NOVEMBER 10. DID IT REFER TO THE NUMBER OF MISSILES, OR MEGATONNAGE? IF THE LATTER, ARE WE THINKING ABOUT AGGREGATE OR AVERAGE MEGATONNAGE? HOW WOULD WE ENVISAGE REDUCING DISPARITY GIVEN THE DIFFERENT THROW-WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS MISSILES? HE CITED THREE TYPES OF EQUIVALENCE -- NUMERICAL, I. E. LAUNCHERS, MEGATONNAGE AND WARHEADS. HE ASKED WHETHER, IF WE GO BEYOND THE NUMERICAL CATEGORY WHERE THE US IS AT A DISADVANTAGE, SOVIETS MIGHT TURN TO THAT AREA OF DISPARITY IN WHICH THEY ARE AT A DISADVANTAGE AND THE WHOLE PROBLEM MIGHT THEN BECOME PRACTICALLY NON-NEGOTIABLE. ON ROSE'S FIRST QUESTION, GARTHOFF DESCRIBED THROW-WEIGHT AS THE WEIGHT OF PAYLOAD WHICH COULD BE DELIVERED ON TARGET, AND WOULD DEPEND ON SUCH VARIABLES AS MISSILE VOLUME AND MISSILE PROPULSION SYSTEM. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT REPRESENTS A RESTRAINT ON INCREASING SOVIET MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT BY FREEZING THE NUMBER OF LARGER MISSILES. AT A MINIMUM WE WOULD WANT TO PRESERVE THAT CONDITION IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, WE SEEK TO REDUCE THE DISPARITY UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS AT PRESENT HAVE ABOUT TWICE THE MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE US. THE MAIN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THROW-WEIGHT CONCEPT IS IN LONG RUN CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE THROUGH MIRVING TO COUNTERFORCE THREAT. WE NOW HAVE AN ADVANTAGE IN MIRV AND GREATER MISSILE ACCURACY, BUT THE SOVIETS CAN BE COUNTED ON TO IMPROVED THEIR RELATIVE STANDING UNLESS THERE IS A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO REDUCE THE LATENT POTENTIAL BY REDUCING DISPARITY IN THROW-WEIGHT. ONE WAY MIGHT BE TO SEEK A REDUCTION IN THE SOVIET SS-9 FORCE. THE PROBLEM IS TO DEVISE A NEGOTIABLE SCHEME. IF WE GO BEYOND NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS, THE SOVIETS WILL

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WANT TO FOCUS ON AREAS WHERE THERE IS EXISTING US ADVANTAGE, AND WE WILL HAVE TO FIND WAYS TO COPE WITH THIS. MOREOVER, SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY ALSO RAISE PROBLEM OF BOMBER PAYLOAD. THIS IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE SINCE A BOMBER CAN CARRY VARIOUS MIXES OF BOMBS, BUT WITH TYPICAL BOMBER LOADINGS WE NOW HAVE ROUGH EQUIVALENCE WITH THE SOVIETS IN PAYLOAD OF MISSILES PLUS BOMBERS.

4. PETRIGNANI (ITALY) STATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT OUR PROGRAM IS TO REDUCE THE DISPARITY IN THROW-WEIGHT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A REDUCTION IN AGGREGATE LEVELS. HE ASKED WHICH WE WERE MORE INTERESTED IN -- REDUCTION OF LEVELS OR REDUCTION OF DISPARITY? GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT THERE WAS INTEREST IN WASHINGTON IN REDUCTION OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS, BUT ALSO QUESTION ABOUT THE VALUE OF REDUCTIONS ALONE WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF DISPARITY IN THROW-WEIGHT. ONE WAY MIGHT BE TO AGREE ON EQUIVALENT AGGREGATE LEVELS AT, SAY, A FEW HUNDRED UNITS LOWER THAN THE CURRENT SOVIET LEVEL, BUT TO SPECIFY THAT SS-9'S AND OTHER LARGE ICBM'S BE PREFERENTIALLY REDUCED. THIS WOULD BE A FORMIDABLE NEGOTIATING TASK, HOWEVER, GIVEN THE MODERNITY AND COST TO THE SOVIETS OF THEIR LARGE MISSILE FORCE AND THE FACT THAT WE COULD NOT OFFER ANY REDUCTIONS OURSELVES IN THIS AREA. PERHAPS WE COULD OFFER A COMPENSATING BOMBER (AND THEREFORE BOMBER PAYLOAD) REDUCTION WITHIN AN OVERALL AGGREGATE. OR, IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY WE MIGHT THINK ABOUT AN EQUAL NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS, AND EQUAL THROW-WEIGHT, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO MIRV. WE WOULD NOT MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN SALT TWO, UNTIL WE COULD ATTEMPT TO DETERMIN WHICH LINE MIGHT BE MOST PROMISING.

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5. FRG REP ASKED WHETHER WE WERE REPLACING NOTION OF PARITY WITH CONCEPT OF EQUIVALENCE OF AGGREGATE. GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT EQUIVALENCE OF AGGREGATE SIMPLY REFLECTED THE CONCEPT OF PARITY AND MEANS GENERALLY AN EQUAL NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS, OR PERHAPS EQUAL NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS PLUS EQUAL THROW-WEIGHT. SOME SOLUTIONS MIGHT NOT INVOLVE CURRENT LEVELS OF THROW-WEIGHT, E.G. SECURING AN AGREEMENT ALLOWING US TO INCREASE MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT TO EQUAL SOVIETS, WHILE ALLOWING THE SOVIETS COMPARABLE RIGHT TO EQUAL BOMBER PAYLOAD.

6. UK REP ASKED WHETHER EQUAL AGGREGATE IN LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT REQUIRE ASYMMETRY INVOLVING SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND NO US REDUCTIONS, EVEN WITH US BOMBERS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. GARTHOFF THOUGHT THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE CASE, AND MIGHT DEPEND IN PART ON CERTAIN MARGINAL CATEGORIES, E.G. BOMBERS IN STORAGE, AND WOULD DEPEND ON LEVEL AT WHICH AGREED AGGREGATE WAS ESTABLISHED. IF IT WERE, SAY, AROUND 2200 THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A REDUCTION OF 300 ON THE SOVIET SIDE BUT PERHAPS NONE FOR US. BUT REDUCTION TO US AUGUST 6, 1970, LEVEL OF 1900, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD INVOLVE REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES EVEN THOUGH SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LOWER

PETRIGNANI ASKED WHETHER EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBER APPLIED TO MEANS

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OF DELIVERY, WHICH GARTHOFF CONFIRMED WAS BASICALLY TRUE I.E. LAUNCHERS OR LAUNCH VEHICLES INCLUDING BOMBERS. HE NOTED THAT ANY PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE PUBLICLY VISIBLE NUMERICAL EQUALITY. THE SOVIETS MIGHT, HOWEVER, PRESS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON FBS BEFORE AGREEING ON AN EQUAL AGGREGATE.

7. CANADIAN REP (BECKETT) ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY DIFFICULTY IN BRINGING BOMBERS INTO THE EQUATION GIVEN ADDITIONAL QUESTION OF AIR DEFENSE. WOULD THE LATTER BE OUTSIDE THE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AS WE NOW SEE IT? GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED TO BE AGREED ON INCLUDING BOMBERS IN NEGOTIATION BUT NO AIR DEFENSES, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEAL ONLY WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, E.G. WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT PROPOSE INCLUSION OF AIR DEFENSE OR ASW SYSTEMS. IT MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE THAT IN DISCUSSION SOVIETS MIGHT RAISE THE QUESTION OF BOMBER ARMAMENTS, AND WE MIGHT THEN RAISE AIR DEFENSES. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAVE A LEGITIMATE CONCERN VIS-A-VIS FBS AND THIRD COUNTRY AIR THREATS, AND GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF INSEPARABILITY OF STRATEGIC AND OTHER AIR DEFENSES, WE THINK ON WHOLE BETTER TO LEAVE IT ASIDE. DISCUSSION OF BOMBERS MIGHT ALSO GET INTO THE QUESTION OF INTER-CONTINENTAL BOMBERS OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS, E.G., U.S. BASED FB-111'S AND THE SOVIET BACKFIRE -- NOT JUST HEAVY BOMBERS AS PREVIOUSLY DEFINED IN NEGOTIATION. THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY PERTINENT IF THE BACFIRE WERE TO BE DEPLOYED WITH AN AERIAL REF-FUELING SYSTEM AND BE GIVEN LONGER RANGE, AS OPPOSED TO PERIPHERAL, THEATER ROLE. BUT POSITON TO DATE HAS BEEN TO COVER ONLY HEAVY BOMBERS. THE US. HAS A LARGER NUMBER OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND NEGOTIATION IN THIS AREA MIGHT BRING US CLOSER TO AN AGREED EQUIVALENT AGGREGATE. UK REP ASKED WHETHER THIS DID NOT BRING MORE US SYSTEMS UNDER RESTRAINT, E.G. BOMBERS IN STORAGE. GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE AS WE COULD, IF REQUIRED TO MEET AGREED LEVELS, REDUCE STORED BOMBERS AND NOT ACTIVE FORCES; IF THE AGGREGATE IS HIGHER, WE COULD REPLACE THEM WITH OTHER NEW ACTIVE SYSTEMS. WILLOT ASKED WHETHER, IF WE GOT INTO DISCUSSION OF INTER-CONTINENTAL BOMBERS, WE DID NOT RISK INCLUSION OF ALL TYPES OF BOMBERS -- EVEN ONE-WAY STRIKE AIRCRAFT. GARTHOFF THOUGHT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN THE SOVIET INTEREST TO RAISE, GIVEN THEIR MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE, BUT CONFIRMED THAT ONE REASON WE HAD CONCENTRATED ON THE HEAVY BOMBER CATEGORY WAS PRECISELY SO AS NOT TO OPEN UP DISCUSSION IN THIS

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8. BECKETT ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY PREFERRED LEVEL FOR AN EQUAL AGGREGATE, I.E., WOULD WE PREFER A FREEZE OR A REDUCTION? GARTHOFF SAID THIS WAS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION, AND THAT WE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REAFFIRM OUR AUGUST 4 POSITION ON NUMBERS WHICH WOULD INVOLVE MORE REDUCTION NOW THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE THEN. THE NUMBER COULD BE ANYWHERE FROM 1500 TO 2500; WE WISH TO EXPLORE THE QUESTION FURTHER BEFORE DECIDING. BECKETT ALSO ASKED WHETHER, EXCEPT FOR SS-9 SUBJ-LIMIT, WE WERE STILL ADHERING TO A ONE-FOR-ONE FIGURE ON FREEDOM TO MIX. GARTHOFF CONFIRMED THIS WAS THE CASE ONE-FOR-ONE. ON FREEDOM TO MIX, WE HAD PROPOSED LAND TO SEA FREEDOM TO MIX, BUT WE WERE RE-EXAMINING THE PROBLEM. WE MIGHT FAVOR A BIT MORE LEEWAY NOW, BUT THIS WAS RELATED TO THE THROW-WEIGHT PROBLEM AND THE LIMITS OF ASSURED VERIFIABILITY OF NEW ICBM SILOS.

9. SEIM (IS) ASKED IF, AND HOW, CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN SALT MIGHT COME UP. GARTHOFF THOUGHT THIS A NON-PROBLEM FOR NOW, GIVEN EVIDENT PRC DISINTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MATTERS, AND THAT NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR WE INTEND TO RAISE THE ISSUE. QUESTION OF INCLUDING PRC IN DISARMAMENT DISCUSSION REMAINS, HOWEVER, AND WILL BECOME MORE GERMANE AS THEIR STRATEGIC CAPABILITY INCREASES.

10. UK REP ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF FARLEY'S REFERENCE TO QUALITATIVE RESTRICTIONS. GARTHOFF SAID THIS REFERRED TO LIMITS ON THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TO POSSIBLE LIMITS ON TESTING OTHER THAN MIRV, E.G. MANEUVERABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES OR DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY VEHICLES. TESTING WAS THE KEY ELEMENT HERE -- NOT EVERYTHING WAS POSSIBLE TO CONSTRAIN THROUGH TESTING LIMITATIONS, BUT SOME THINGS WERE.

11. DUTCH REP ASKED WHETHER US HAD EXAMINED POSSIBILITY OF UNDERSEA SANCTUARIES FOR SSBN'S, AS DESCRIBED IN RECENT NY TIMES ARTICLE. GARTHOFF CONFIRMED THAT US HAD IN FACT LOOKED AT THIS POSSIBILITY AMONG OTHERS AS A MEANS OF ENHANCING STABILITY BY MAINTAINING SUBMARIENS CAPACITY FOR A CERTAIN LEVEL OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WE HAD NOT CONCLUDED THAT ANTI-ASW MEASURES WERE WORTH PURSUING HOWEVER, AND THIS PARTICULAR ONE HAD A NUMBER OF DEFECTS.

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12. WILLOT PICKED UP THE SUBJECT OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION AND ASKED WHETHER THE US HAD GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR IN TERMS OF WHAT EACH MIGHT CONSIDER TO BE ITS THRESHOLD OF SURVIVABILITY. HE FELT THAT ANY SALT AGREEMENT SHOULD PERMIT STRATEGIC ARMS LEVELS HIGH ENOUGH TO ASSURE DAMAGE TO THE USSR AT THAT MINIMUM LEVEL AND THAT, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET REGIME, THAT LEVEL MIGHT WILL BE HIGHER FOR THEM THAN FOR THE US. HE ALSO SOUGHT CURRENT US VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AS SUCH RELATIONSHIP MIGHT BE REFLECTED IN SALT. HE URGED THAT WE AVOID SEPARATING THE TWO IN UNCOORDINATED FASHION OR REACHING ANY AGREEMENT IN SALT WITHOUT ANY AGREEMENT ON TACTICAL WEAPONS. ON WILLOT'S FIRST POINT, GARTHOFF CONFIRMED THAT US POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN FORCES OF SUFFICIENT POWER TO CONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT REGARDLESS OF ANY REASONABLE DESTRUCTION THRESHOLD, WHICH COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE OBJECTIVELY DEFINED FOR ALL SITUATIONS. GENERALLY, THE US HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED A FIGURE OF MAGNITUDE OF 20-25 PERCENT DESTRUCTION OF SOVIET INDUSTRY AND POPULATION (NOW 50 MILLION). WE WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES SUFFICIENT TO COVER ALL REASONABLE VARIATIONS IN THIS ESTIMATE. HE ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY SAW LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOVIET AND US PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEVEL OF ACCEPTABLE DESTRUCTION AND THAT MUTUAL DETERRENCE WAS NOT A FRAGILE CONCEPT. ON WILLOT'S

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SECOND QUESTION, HE INVITED VIEWS AROUND THE TABLE AS TO WHAT, IF ANY, LINK SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SALT BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE US HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT PRUDENT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS WITHOUT SALT DEALING WITH TACTICAL SYSTEMS. WILL OT REPLIED THAT THIS WAS TRUE, BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET TAC NUCS AT SOME POINT. HE WAS MOST DUBIOUS ABOUT MBFR MIXED PACKAGE TRADE-OFFS WHICH WOULD INVOLVE ALLIANCE, AS OPPOSED TO US, WEAPONS. GARTHOFF REPLIED THAT WE HAD GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR AND THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO OPERATE ON SEPARATE OR UNCOORDINATED TRACKS WHICH MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, PUT US FBS IN DOUBLE NEGOTIATING JEOPARDY. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE AN OVERLAP BETWEEN THE TWO AREAS OF NEGOTIATION, BUT IT WOULD BE A PARTIAL ONE. HE NOTED THAT INCLUDING TACTICAL WEAPONS IN MBFR MIGHT PUT UP FOR NEGOTIATION SYSTEMS WE DID NOT WANT NEGOTIATED, E. G. STRIKE AIRCRAFT ON CARRIERS IN THE MED. AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A DANGER OF EXTENDING MBFR TO OTHER AREAS, LIKE THE PACIFIC, WHERE OUR FBS WERE OF INTEREST TO THE USSR. HE THOUGHT WE COULD DEAL WITH THE TAC NUC QUESTIONS IN BOTH NEGOTIATING FORA, HOWEVER IN VARIOUS COMBINATIONS, E. G. IN A MINIMAL WAY IN BOTH (NON-CIRCUMVENTION IN SALT AND COMPLETE EXCLUSION FROM MBFR) OR -- AS AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE HAD ONCE SUGGESTED -- A CEILING ON NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS IN SALT WITH SOME REDUCTIONS IN MBFR, AS LONG AS THE TWO EFFORTS WERE COORDINATED. WE WOULD COLLECTIVELY HAVE TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS THE OPTIMUM COMBINATION FOR THE ALLIANCE THROUGH FURTHER CONSIDERATION. HE REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT WE WANTED TO HOLD THE SALT FOCUS ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND WOULD REBUT THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT US FBS MUST BE SINGLED OUT FOR DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS IN SALT.

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